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SINKING THE ISLAND OF CONSTITUTIONAL
TAX IMMUNITY: A UNIFORM APPROACH TO
STATE TAXES ON GOODS IN TRANSIT
UNDER THE IMPORT-EXPORT CLAUSE
Warren Furman Smith
The Framers of the U.S. Constitution adopted the
Import-Export Clause to prohibit the states from
interfering in international relations, to preserve import
revenue for the federal government, and to ensure
harmony between the states. The purposive inquiry
established by Michelin and Washington Stevedoring is
applied for all imports and exports except one category:
export goods in transit. The pre-Michelin decision,
Richfield Oil, provides complete constitutional tax
immunity for export goods in transit. This island of
constitutional tax immunity forces local taxpayers to
subsidize exporters and foreign consumers and unfairly
burdens coastal states with the regulatory,
administrative, and environmental costs of shipping
exports with no means to tax the beneficiaries of these
services. This Note urges the Supreme Court to overturn
Richfield Oil and apply the Michelin approach
uniformly to import and export goods, in accordance
with the text and purpose of the Import-Export Clause.
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policy.

699

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 2019

1

Georgia Law Review, Vol. 53, No. 2 [2019], Art. 7

700

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53:699

TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION.......................................................................... 701
II. BACKGROUND .......................................................................... 703
A. THE IMPORT-EXPORT CLAUSE ......................................... 703
B. THE MICHELIN REVOLUTION ........................................... 706
C. THE MICHELIN RESERVATION ......................................... 710
III. ANALYSIS ............................................................................... 713
A. THE TEXT OF THE IMPORT-EXPORT CLAUSE .................... 713
1. The Import-Export Clause Applies Uniformly to
Imports and Exports .............................................. 713
2. The Import-Export Clause Focuses on the Nature of the
Tax, Not the Goods ................................................ 715
3. There is No Textual Support for the “In Transit”
Distinction ............................................................. 716
B. THE INTENT OF THE IMPORT-EXPORT CLAUSE ................ 718
1. Richfield Oil Risks Distorting the Framers’ Intent . 718
2. Richfield Oil Risks Subsidizing Exporters at the
Expense of Local Taxpayers ................................... 719
3. Richfield Oil Prohibits Otherwise Valid, NonDiscriminatory Taxation ....................................... 721
IV. CONCLUSION .......................................................................... 723

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/glr/vol53/iss2/7

2

Smith: Sinking the Island of Constitutional Tax Immunity: A Uniform Appr

2019]

SINKING THE ISLAND

701

I. INTRODUCTION
When the United States Supreme Court’s Import-Export
Clause jurisprudence veered in a new direction in Michelin Tire
Corp. v. Wages,1 the issue of whether to apply this new analysis to
export goods in transit fell by the wayside. The Michelin Court no
longer assumed that the Import-Export Clause provided absolute
tax immunity to all imports and exports but instead developed an
analysis based on the history and intent of the Import-Export
Clause itself.2 However, the Michelin Court qualified its holding by
noting that the property tax in question applied to goods “no longer
in transit” rather than to goods that were in transit.3 The Court did
not address whether the Michelin approach applied to goods in
transit,4 leaving lower courts to wrestle with how Richfield Oil Corp.
v. State Board of Equalization,5 the pre-Michelin decision on export
goods in transit, applies in the wake of the Michelin reasoning and
resulting in a non-uniform application of the Import-Export
Clause.6

1 See 423 U.S. 276, 279 (1976) (overruling Low v. Austin, 13 Wall. 29 (1872)); see also
Walter Hellerstein, Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages: Enhanced State Power to Tax Imports, 1976
SUP. CT. REV. 99, 99 (1976) (“In Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, the Supreme Court abandoned
a century of [Import-Export Clause] precedent . . . .”).
2 See Dep’t of Revenue v. Ass’n of Wash. Stevedoring Cos., 435 U.S. 734, 751 (1978)
(noting that the Michelin Court “surveyed the history and purposes of the Import-Export
Clause to determine, for the first time, which taxes fell within the absolute ban on ‘Imposts
or Duties’”).
3 423 U.S. at 302. The “in transit” distinction stems from the pre-Michelin “export stream”
doctrine. See infra note 30.
4 See Ass’n of Wash. Stevedoring Cos., 435 U.S. at 758 n.23 (deferring the “question of the
applicability of the Michelin approach when a State directly taxes imports or exports in
transit”).
5 329 U.S. 69 (1946).
6 The four-decades-old disagreement in lower courts lingers even today. Compare Dulles
Duty Free, LLC v. Cty. of Loudoun, 803 S.E.2d 54, 61 (Va. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 1440
(Mem) (Apr. 2, 2018) (applying Richfield Oil to invalidate a local gross receipts tax on sales
to passengers on international flights because “the issue whether the Michelin test would
apply to a non-discriminatory tax that falls on . . . goods in transit” had not yet been decided
by the Supreme Court), with P.J. Lumber Co. v. Cty. of Prichard, 249 So. 3d 1135, 1139 (Ala.
Civ. App. 2017) (applying the Michelin approach to uphold a tax based on the gross receipts
of export goods because Richfield Oil is “no longer valid”).
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The Import-Export Clause was adopted to prohibit seaboard
states from exploiting their inland neighbors,7 but the lingering
exception to the Michelin approach has contorted it into a means of
subsidizing exporters at the expense of local taxpayers. Richfield Oil
provides a “bright-line immunity for goods in the stream of export”
even when exporters benefit from local police, fire protection, and
other government services.8 The expansion of this sphere of absolute
tax immunity is welcomed by exporters.9 Richfield Oil subverts the
Import-Export Clause’s purpose because the Framers of the
Constitution “did not expect residents of the ports to subsidize
commerce headed inland.”10 Richfield Oil’s grant of tax immunity
for export goods in transit has become what Justice Black feared at
the time: “an island of constitutional tax immunity.”11 This Note will
discuss how the application of the Michelin approach to export goods
in transit is more consistent with the Import-Export Clause.
Part II of this Note will examine the origin and purpose of the
Import-Export Clause and how Michelin began an important shift
in Import-Export Clause jurisprudence by applying a policy-based
approach more compatible with the text and original intent of the
Import-Export Clause. Part II will explain how Michelin’s
reservation for “in transit” goods has resulted in inconsistent
application of the Import-Export Clause to export goods in transit.
Part III of this Note will argue that the Supreme Court should
overturn Richfield Oil and apply the Michelin approach to both
import and export goods. Because Michelin adopted a test that
7 See Boris I. Bittker & Brannon P. Denning, The Import-Export Clause, 68 MISS. L.J.
521, 522 (1998) (noting the origin of the Import-Export Clause as a remedy for “commercial
strife”).
8 Virginia Indonesia Co. v. Harris Cty. Appraisal Dist., 910 S.W.2d 905, 911 (Tex. 1995).
9 See Carrie Salls, Duty free stores at Dulles Airport win at VA. SC; Decision significant
for
Import-Export
Clause,
LEGAL
NEWSLINE
(Sept.
6,
2017),
https://legalnewsline.com/stories/511204498-duty-free-stores-at-dulles-airport-win-at-va-scdecision-significant-for-import-export-clause (quoting Dulles Duty Free’s attorney praising
the court’s decision as “perhaps the most significant Import-Export Clause decision issued in
the last 20 years” that will “affect the entire U.S. duty-free industry”). But see Daniel Hemel,
The Tax Battle Brewing (Just) Outside the Capitol, MEDIUM, (Dec. 22, 2017),
https://medium.com/whatever-source-derived/the-tax-battle-brewing-just-outside-thecapitol-410760db3830 (arguing that “[w]hatever your view of constitutional interpretation,
the [export stream] doctrine offers little to love”).
10 Dep’t of Revenue v. Ass’n of Wash. Stevedoring Cos., 435 U.S. 734, 753–54 (1978).
11 Richfield Oil Corp. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 329 U.S. 69, 87 (1946) (Black, J.,
dissenting).
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analyzes whether a tax is consistent with the policies of the ImportExport Clause, the potential exception under Richfield Oil implies
that a tax may be prohibited by the Constitution despite being fully
consistent with the Constitution’s underlying policies. This Note
will conclude that the Michelin approach should be applied
uniformly to imports and exports in analyzing the constitutionality
of state taxes under the Import-Export Clause.
II. BACKGROUND
The Import-Export Clause was included in the U.S. Constitution
to achieve three primary purposes: first, to allow the Federal
Government to conduct foreign policy without interference from the
states; second, to reserve imports as an exclusive source of federal
revenue; and third, to promote interstate harmony.12 In 1976, the
Supreme Court established an approach to evaluating duties in
Michelin that ensured only those exactions that impinge the
purposes of the Import-Export Clause would be constitutionally
prohibited.13 However, Richfield Oil has never been overturned and
stands as a possible exception to the Michelin approach.14
A. THE IMPORT-EXPORT CLAUSE

The Michelin revolution had its basis in the origin of the ImportExport Clause itself. As the Michelin Court noted, “a compelling
reason for the calling of the Constitutional Convention of 1787 was
the fact that the Articles essentially left the individual States free
to burden commerce among themselves and with foreign countries
very much as they pleased.”15 For example, New York City
instituted a tariff on goods from Connecticut and New Jersey to
12 See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 534, 555–58 (1959) (listing these
three purposes as forces that led to the inclusion of the Import-Export Clause).
13 See Bittker & Denning, supra note 7, at 530 (noting that the Court adopted a new
approach to the Import-Export Clause in Michelin).
14 See United States v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 517 U.S. 843, 862 (1996) (suggesting in
dicta that the core holding in Richfield Oil has not been overruled).
15 Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276, 283 (1976); see also Cook v. Pennsylvania,
97 U.S. 566, 574 (1878) (“A careful reader of the history of the times which immediately
preceded the assembling of the convention that framed the American Constitution cannot fail
to discover that the need of some equitable and just regulation of commerce was among the
most influential causes which led to its meeting.”).
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prevent commerce from “carr[ying] thousands of dollars out of the
city and into the pockets of detested Yankees and despised
Jerseymen.”16 Because of this tariff and other tariffs protecting
Pennsylvania, James Madison described New Jersey’s commerce as
a “[c]ask tapped at both ends.”17 The New Jersey legislature
retaliated,18 and one New Jersey newspaper decried this abuse as
“a tribute to those states which even Great Britain would have
disdained to exact.”19 These discriminatory tariffs, permitted by the
Articles of Confederation, worked to undermine the unity of the
fledgling nation, which called for a solution.
To prevent this commercial warfare between the states, the
Framers proposed a solution: the Import-Export Clause. 20 This
sparked a heated debate,21 producing a rather detailed and
comprehensive Import-Export Clause:
No State shall, without the Consent of the Congress, lay
any Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports, except
what may be absolutely necessary for executing it’s [sic]
inspection Laws: and the net Produce of all Duties and
Imposts, laid by any State on Imports or Exports, shall
be for the Use of the Treasury of the United States; and
all such Laws shall be subject to the Revision and
Control of the Congress.22
While the Import-Export Clause was adopted primarily to put an
end to the economic rivalries of the states, the Framers had other
purposes for the constitutional provision. The Import-Export Clause
JOHN FISKE, THE CRITICAL PERIOD OF AMERICAN HISTORY 146 (1888).
James Madison, Preface to Debates in the Convention of 1787, in 3 THE RECORDS OF THE
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 539, 542 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1966).
18 See FISKE, supra note 16, at 147 (reporting that New Jersey placed a $1,800 tax on a
New York municipal lighthouse located in New Jersey's jurisdiction).
19 WILLIAM C. HUNTER, THE COMMERCIAL POLICY OF NEW JERSEY UNDER THE
CONFEDERATION, 32 (1922).
20 See Bittker & Denning, supra note 7, at 521–22 (arguing that while the “Import-Export
Clause has long been overshadowed by the Commerce Clause,” the Import-Export Clause was
the “principal remedy proposed by the Philadelphia Convention to remedy the commercial
strife”).
21 See id. at 523 (arguing that the detailed state of the Import-Export Clause reflected the
“spirited debated that aired a diversity of rival proposals for ending the perceived commercial
evils”).
22 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 2.
16
17
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was intended to reserve import duties as a primary source of
revenue for the Federal Government.23 Without reserving the
exclusive power to the Federal Government to levy duties on
imports and exports, the United States could not speak with one
voice when regulating commercial relations.24
The Supreme Court had recognized these three underlying
purposes of the Import-Export Clause before the Michelin court
shifted Import-Export Clause jurisprudence. In Youngstown Sheet
& Tube Co. v. Bowers, the Court listed the “forces which led to the
inclusion of Art. I, s 10, cl. 2, the Import-Export Clause in the
Constitution.”25 First in importance was ensuring the government’s
ability to “speak with one voice when regulating commercial
intercourse,” followed by “secur[ing] to the National Government an
important source of revenue” and “prevent[ing] the seaboard States,
possessed of important ports of entry, from levying taxes on goods
flowing through their ports to inland States.”26 However, the
Supreme Court in Youngstown did not apply these purposes directly
to that case, instead making “essentially a determination of the
physical status of the foreign goods.”27 This was typical of the
Import-Export Clause approach prior to Michelin.

23 See, e.g., Letter from North Carolina Delegates to Governor Caswell (Sept. 18, 1787), in
3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, 83, 84 (Max Farrand ed., 1911)
(expecting “a considerable Share of the National Taxes [to] be collected by Impost, Duties,
and Excises”); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 11 at 85 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter
ed., 1961) (noting that “the greatest part of the national revenue is derived from taxes of the
indirect kind, from imposts, and from excises”).
24 See, e.g., CHARLES PINKNEY, OBSERVATIONS ON THE PLAN OF GOVERNMENT, in 3 THE
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 116 (Max Farrand ed., 1911) (“The
intention [of the Import-Export Clause] is to invest the United States with the power of
rendering our maritime regulations uniform and efficient, and to enable them to raise a
revenue, for Federal purposes, uncontrolable by the States.”); see also THE FEDERALIST NO.
11, supra note 23, at 91 (demanding that the United States “concur in erecting one great
American system . . . and [be] able to dictate the terms of the connection between the old and
new world!”).
25 358 U.S. 534, 555 (1959).
26 Id. at 556.
27 Id. at 558. The Youngstown Court recognized the “original package” doctrine, while
noting that “[b]reaking the original package in only one of the ways by which packaged goods
that have been imported for use in manufacturing lose their distinctive character as imports.”
Id. at 548.
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B. THE MICHELIN REVOLUTION

Before Michelin, determinations of the constitutionality of taxes
on imports and exports rested on whether the physical good being
taxed was an import or export.28 In Brown v. Maryland, the court
held that imports received state tax immunity so long as they
remained in their “original package.”29 Building on that, Low v.
Austin held that the Import-Export Clause prohibits states from
imposing non-discriminatory property taxes on imports until they
lose their character as imports by becoming “incorporated into the
mass of property in the state.”30 Exports were immune to state
taxation as soon as they entered the “export stream.”31 Goods enter
the export stream when they begin their “final continuous journey
out of the country.”32 As soon as the goods entered the export
stream, under this earlier approach, they enjoyed absolutely tax
immunity.33 Both the “original package” doctrine and “export
stream” rules fail to inquire whether the taxes imposed are the
types of imposts or duties prohibited by the Import-Export Clause
and instead focus on the nature of the goods being taxed. This
mechanistic approach was much criticized.34 Michelin changed this
28 See Dep’t of Revenue v. Ass’n of Wash. Stevedoring Cos., 435 U.S. 734, 752 (1978)
(“Previous cases had assumed that all taxes on imports and exports and on the importing and
exporting processes were banned by the Clause.”).
29 25 U.S. 419, 442 (1827) (applying the “original-package doctrine” to provide immunity
to imports still “in the original form or package in which it was imported”).
30 See Low v. Austin, 13 Wall. 29, 33 (1872); see also Michelin, 423 U.S. at 282 (calling Low
“the leading decision of this Court” for the proposition that goods lose their character as
imports by being incorporated into the mass of property in the state).
31 See, e.g., Coe v. Errol, 116 U.S. 517, 525 (1886) (developing the export stream rule, which
provided exports with tax immunity once sufficient commencement of the exportation process
occurred); see also Richfield Oil Corp. v. State Bd. Of Equalization, 329 U.S. 69, 83 (1946)
(striking down a tax as unconstitutional when oil was delivered into storage tanks of a New
Zealand-bound steamer because it “marked the commencement of the movement of the oil
abroad”). But see United States v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 517 U.S. 843, 871 (1996) (Kennedy,
J., dissenting) (arguing that the export stream rule draws parties into “the factual morass of
determining when exportation has begun”).
32 See Dep’t of Revenue v. Ass’n of Washington Stevedoring Cos., 435 U.S. 735, 752 (1978).
33 See id. (recognizing that under the “export stream” rule, “[a]s soon as the journey began,
tax immunity attached”).
34 See, e.g., Alexander R. Early & Robert G. Weitzman, A Century of Dissent: The Immunity
of Goods Imported for Resale from Nondiscriminatory State Personal Property Taxes, 7 SW.
U. L. REV. 247, 249 (1975) (arguing that the distinction between discriminatory and nondiscriminatory states taxes “has not always been properly considered by courts” before
Michelin).
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inquiry entirely and adopted a new, policy-based approach to the
Import-Export Clause.35
At issue in Michelin was a non-discriminatory Georgia ad
valorem property tax on the taxpayer’s inventory of imported tires.36
These tires had been imported from the taxpayer’s French factory
and were being stored in its Gwinnett County warehouse until the
tires would be delivered to the taxpayer’s franchised dealers in
nearby states.37 This ad valorem property tax was nondiscriminatory because it applied to all goods owned by Georgia
taxpayers on the day of assessment, whether or not they had been
imported.38 By definition, a non-discriminatory tax does not
discriminate against goods “because of their place of origin.”39 The
Supreme Court of Georgia upheld the non-discriminatory ad
valorem property tax under the original package doctrine.40 On
appeal to the United State Supreme Court, both sides focused their
arguments around the application of the original package
doctrine.41 The Michelin Court, however, used this case as an
opportunity to announce a “modern Import-Export Clause test.”42
The Michelin Court overruled Low and repudiated the original
package doctrine.43 Instead, the Court applied a three-part test
based on the three primary goals of the Import-Export Clause:
The Framers of the Constitution thus sought to
alleviate three main concerns by committing sole power
to lay imposts and duties on imports in the Federal
35 See Bittker & Denning, supra note 7, at 530 (arguing that Michelin overthrew “almost
a century and a half of case law and adopt[ed] a fundamentally new analysis of the ImportExport Clause”).
36 See Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276, 276 (1976).
37 See id. at 280 (finding that distribution of the tires was limited to the “franchised dealers
with whom petitioner does all of its business in six southeastern States”).
38 See Bittker & Denning, supra note 7, at 530 (noting that the tax applied to all goods
“whether imported or locally produced”).
39 Michelin Tire Corp., 423 U.S. at 286.
40 See Wages v. Michelin Tire Corp., 214 S.E.2d 349, 355 (Ga. 1975) (upholding the tax on
unpackaged tire inventory because commingling the tires with other shipments caused the
inventory to lose its status as imports).
41 See Michelin Tire Corp., 423 U.S. at 302 (White, J., concurring) (arguing that there was
no reason to overrule Low because “[n]one of the parties has challenged that case here, and
the issue of its overruling has not been briefed or argued”).
42 Itel Containers Int’l Corp. v. Huddleston, 507 U.S. 60, 76 (1993).
43 Michelin Tire Corp., 423 U.S. at 301 (overruling Low v. Austin).
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Government, with no concurrent state power: [1] the
Federal Government must speak with one voice when
regulating commercial relations with foreign
governments . . . ; [2] import revenues were to be the
major source of revenue of the Federal Government and
should not be diverted to the States; [and 3] harmony
among the States might be disturbed unless seaboard
States . . .
were prohibited from levying taxes on
citizens of other States by taxing goods merely flowing
through their ports . . . .44
Therefore, a state tax only impugns the Import-Export Clause if
it interferes with one of these three objectives. In support of this
policy-based approach, the Michelin Court quoted Chief Justice
Marshall’s cautionary remark in Brown that it “might be premature
to state any rule as being universal in its application.”45 Therefore,
the test had to be a somewhat functional approach.46
In applying this approach to the Georgia tax at issue in Michelin,
the Court concluded that the non-discriminatory property tax did
not offend the first purpose because it did “not fall on imports as
such because of their place of origin,” could not “be used to create
special protective tariffs or particular preferences for certain
domestic goods,” could not “be applied . . .to encourage or discourage
any importation in a manner inconsistent with federal regulation,”
and therefore could “have no impact whatsoever on the Federal
Government’s exclusive regulation of foreign commerce . . . .”47 The
tax also “deprive[d] the Federal Government of nothing [such as
revenues from imposts and duties on imports and exports] to which
it is entitled.”48 Nor did Georgia’s tax violate the preservation of
interstate harmony because such non-discriminatory taxation did
“not interfere with the free flow of imported goods among the States,
as did the exactions by States under the Articles of Confederation

Id. at 285–286.
Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. 440, 441 (1827).
46 See Michelin Tire Corp., 423 U.S. at 299–300 (noting that although “the line of division
is in some degree vague and indefinite,” it could not be drawn “more in harmony with the
obvious intention and object of this provision in the constitution”).
47 Id. at 286.
48 Id. at 286-87.
44
45
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directed solely at imported goods.”49 The Court thus concluded that
the Georgia non-discriminatory property tax was “not the type of
state exaction which the Framers of the Constitution or the Court
in Brown had in mind as being an ‘impost’ or ‘duty’” because the tax
violated none of the Import-Export Clause’s underlying purposes.50
Two years after the Supreme Court repudiated the original
package doctrine for exports, the Supreme Court addressed the
rule’s counterpart, the export stream rule. In Washington
Department of Revenue v. Association of Washington Stevedoring
Companies, the Court held that “the Michelin approach should
apply to taxation involving exports as well as imports.”51 The case
involved the assessment of a state business and occupation tax to
stevedoring, the process of loading and unloading cargo from
ships.52 The Court applied the approach adopted for imports in
Michelin to stevedores, who load and unload both imports and
exports.53 However, in applying the Michelin approach to exports,
the tax does not need to protect federal revenues, because the
Constitution forbids any federal taxation of exports.54 Therefore, a
tax on exports satisfies the Michelin approach so long as it neither
disrupts United States foreign policy nor creates friction among the
states.55 The Washington Stevedoring court concluded that the tax
satisfied both prongs of the Michelin approach as applied to

Id. at 288.
Id. at 283.
51 See Dep’t of Revenue v. Ass’n Wash. Stevedoring Cos., 435 U.S. 734, 758 (1978)
(discussing the formal differences between the analyses for import and export cases but
concluding that the Michelin approach should apply to the taxation of both).
52 See id. at 736 (noting that “the State of Washington would apply its business and
occupation tax to stevedoring”).
53 See id. at 758 (reasoning that despite the “formal differences [between imports and
exports], the Michelin approach should apply to taxation involving exports as well as
imports”).
54 The sole difference in applying the Michelin approach to exports is required by the
separate constitutional provision. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 5 (“No Tax or Duty shall be
laid on Articles exported from any State . . . .”).
55 See Ass’n Wash. Stevedoring Cos., 435 U.S. at 758 (stating that the export-tax ban of
the Import-Export Clause “vindicates two of the three policies identified in Michelin”).
49
50
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exports.56 However, the Supreme Court did not expressly overrule
the export stream rule itself.57
C. THE MICHELIN RESERVATION

The 1946 Richfield Oil decision remains “an island of
constitutional tax immunity”58 yet-untouched by the rising tide of
the Court’s new approach begun in Michelin. In Richfield Oil, the
Supreme Court invalidated a California gross receipts tax on the
export of oil to the New Zealand government as a violation of the
Import-Export Clause.59 The Court applied the then-prevailing
export stream rule, noting that delivery of oil into the vessel
“marked the commencement of the movement of the oil abroad.”60
Therefore, the oil was an export and received absolute immunity
from any taxation, even a non-discriminatory state tax.61 In
reaching its holding, the Richfield Oil Court did not examine
whether the tax itself was one that the Import-Export Clause was
designed to prevent but instead focused on the character of the good
being taxed.62 This analysis, which focused on the character of the
good rather than the character of the tax, was the type of inquiry
the Michelin Court rejected.63
Despite the conflict between the Michelin approach and the
earlier Import-Export Clause jurisprudence applied in Richfield
Oil, questions about the validity of state taxes on export goods in

56 See id. at 755 (holding that “the Washington tax is not a prohibited ‘Impost or Duty’
[because] it violates none of the policies”).
57 See Virginia Indonesia Co. v. Harris Cty. Appraisal Dist., 910 S.W.2d 905, 912 (Tex.
1995) (applying the export stream rule “[i]n light of the fact that the United States Supreme
Court has not overruled Coe v. Errol or any of its progeny”).
58 Richfield Oil Corp. v. State Bd. Of Equalization, 329 U.S. 69, 87 (1946) (Black, J.,
dissenting).
59 See id. at 86 (“We conclude that the tax which California has exacted from appellant is
an impost upon an export within the meaning of Article I, Section 10, Clause 2, and is
therefore unconstitutional.”).
60 Id. at 83.
61 See id. at 76 (arguing that the Import-Export Clause “prohibits every State from laying
‘any’ tax on imports or exports”).
62 See id. at 76–78 (considering “whether we have here an export” instead of the question
of whether the tax itself was an exaction that Import-Export Clause “was designed to prevent”
because the intention of the provision was “only a phase of a larger design”).
63 See Limbach v. Hooven & Allison Co., 466 U.S. 353, 360 (1984) (stating that the focus
was “the nature of the tax at issue” and not “the nature of the goods”).

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/glr/vol53/iss2/7

12

Smith: Sinking the Island of Constitutional Tax Immunity: A Uniform Appr

2019]

SINKING THE ISLAND

711

transit have lingered. When the Michelin Court finished outlining
the purposes of the Import-Export Clause, it concluded that:
Nothing in the history of the Import-Export Clause even
remotely suggests that a nondiscriminatory ad valorem
property tax which is also imposed on imported goods
that are no longer in import transit was the type of
exaction that was regarded as objectionable by the
Framers of the Constitution.64
The Court, however, never provided any reasoning to support its
reservation for goods that “are no longer in import transit . . . .”65
Instead, the Court in Washington Stevedoring, over the dissent of
Justice Powell, declined to clarify this point, opting to defer the
decision.66 Nonetheless, the Supreme Court itself has questioned
whether Richfield Oil remains good law. In Itel Containers
International Corp. v. Huddleston, the Court declined to apply
Richfield Oil’s “in transit” approach “[e]ven assuming that rule has
not been altered by the approach [the Court] adopted in Michelin.”67
Due to the lingering doubts surrounding Richfield Oil’s
continuing validity, lower courts have struggled to determine
whether to apply the Michelin approach to state taxes on export
goods in transit. Indeed, many courts have been skeptical of
Richfield Oil, 68 such as an Alabama appellate court which upheld a
Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276, 286 (1976) (emphasis added).
Id.
66 See 435 U.S. at 758 n.23 (“We do not reach the question of the applicability of the
Michelin approach when a State directly taxes imports or exports in transit” until “a case
with pertinent facts is presented” and “the issue with all its ramifications may be decided.”).
67 507 U.S. 60, 77 (1993); but see United States v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 517 U.S. 843,
862 (1996) (stating in dicta that the Court had not overruled the core holding of Richfield Oil
and had “never upheld a state tax assessed directly on goods in import or export transit”).
68 See, e.g., Auto Cargo, Inc. v. Miami Dade Cty., 237 F.3d 1289, 1294 (11th Cir. 2001)
(applying the Michelin approach to goods in export transit because “Michelin establishes the
only applicable standard”); Duty Free Shoppers, Ltd. v. Tax Comm’r, 464 F. Supp. 730, 733–
34 (D. Guam 1979) (applying the Michelin approach); Alaska Dep’t of Revenue v. Alaska Pulp
America, Inc., 674 P.2d 268, 280 (Ak. 1983) (upholding a tax covering exports under Michelin
because it “merely requires the taxpayers to pay their just share for the privilege of
conducting business”); Arizona Dep't of Revenue v. Robinson’s Hardware, 721 P.2d 137, 139
(Ariz. 1986) (finding that “the rule enunciated in Richfield is no longer the proper standard
by which to measure the validity of state taxation” and that the Michelin approach “is now
the proper standard”); Holt Hauling & Warehousing System, Inc. v. Director, Div. of Taxation,
9 N.J. Tax 446 (1987) (applying “[t]he prevailing rule” from Michelin to goods in export
64
65
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business-license tax on revenue from exported goods.69 Richfield Oil
was the cornerstone of the appellant’s argument that the ImportExport Clause prohibited the tax.70 The court noted that the
authority the appellant relied on “to support its contentions are no
longer valid” and applied the Michelin approach instead.71 Other
courts have been more hesitant to abandon Richfield Oil without a
clear statement by the Supreme Court.72 For instance, the Virginia
Supreme Court determined that the “[r]esolution of the
constitutional propriety of the BPOL tax to Duty Free’s in-transit
export sales hinges on the applicability, and ongoing validity, of the
decision in Richfield Oil.”73 The court then invalidated the tax
because, although Michelin “significantly revised [the Supreme
Court’s] Import-Export Clause jurisprudence,” Richfield Oil has not
been overruled and “the Court has carefully carved out for future
disposition the issue whether the Michelin test would apply to a
non-discriminatory tax that falls on export goods in transit.”74 This
open question of constitutional law has divided the federal courts of
appeals and state courts of last resort, leading to inconsistent
results.75 Lower court judges seek clarification on the issue from the
United States Supreme Court.76
transit); U.S. Steel Mining Co., LLC v. Helton, 631 S.E.2d 559, 564 (W. Va. 2005) (holding
that Michelin has “fully supplanted the more mechanistic ‘in export transit’ approach of
earlier cases like Richfield Oil”).
69 See P.J. Lumber Co. v. City of Prichard, 249 So. 3d 1135, 1135 (2017) (upholding the tax
on exports under the Michelin analysis).
70 See id. at 1139 (noting that P.J. Lumber’s argument cites to “a number of cases decided
before 1976, when in Michelin . . . the United States Supreme Court ‘initiated a different
approach to Import-Export Clause cases’”).
71 Id.
72 See, e.g., Louisiana Land & Expl. Co. v. Pilot Petroleum Corp., 900 F.2d 816, 816 (5th
Cir. 1990) (striking down a tax on goods in export transit under the Import-Export Clause,
using reasoning of both Michelin and Richfield Oil); Connell Rice & Sugar Co., Inc. v. Cty. of
Yolo, 569 F.2d 514, 518 (9th Cir. 1978) (citing Richfield Oil as “helpful authorit[y]”); Ammex,
Inc. v. Dep’t of Treasury, 603 N.W.2d 308, 313 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999) (applying Richfield Oil
because it has “never been expressly overruled”); Virginia Indonesia Co. v. Harris Cty.
Appraisal Dist., 910 S.W.2d, 905 911 (Tex. 1995) (holding that “Michelin appears to preserve
bright-line immunity for goods in the stream of export” but that this issue “remains
uncertain” until the Supreme Court addresses it).
73 Dulles Duty Free, LLC v. County of Loudoun, 803 S.E.2d 54, 57 (Va. 2017).
74 Id. at 61.
75 Compare supra note 68 with supra note 72.
76 U.S. Steel Mining Co., LLC, 631 S.E.2d 559, 580 (W. Va. 2005) (Benjamin, J., dissenting)
(hoping “that the United States Supreme Court would take the opportunity to bring a new
clarity to this area of constitutional law in the near future”).
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III. ANALYSIS
Richfield Oil is inconsistent with the text and intent of the
Import-Export Clause. Because the Michelin approach embodies the
Framers’ intentions for the Import-Export Clause, it should be
applied uniformly to both imports and exports. Post-Michelin courts
that apply Richfield Oil to state taxes on export goods in transit
have done so not because the Import-Export Clause demands it but
solely on the basis that the Supreme Court has not yet explicitly
overruled Richfield Oil.77 However, inconsistent precedent cannot
alter the meaning of a constitutional provision.78 In determining the
meaning of the Import-Export Clause and its proper application, it
is necessary to examine the language of the provision at issue.79 The
language actually adopted elucidates the Framers’ intentions, and
thus the Michelin analysis is in line with both the text and the
purpose of the Import-Export Clause.80
A. THE TEXT OF THE IMPORT-EXPORT CLAUSE

1. The Import-Export Clause Applies Uniformly to Imports and
Exports
The text of the Import-Export Clause evinces no rationale by
which imports and exports should be treated differently. The
provision contains the term “exports” only in conjunction with
“imports,”81 which necessarily demonstrates that all prohibitions on

77 See, e.g., Virginia Indonesia Co., 910 S.W. 2d at 905 (applying Richfield Oil’s bright-line
immunity for goods in the stream of export because it has not been explicitly overruled).
78 See William O. Douglas, Stare Decisis, 49 COLUM. L. REV. 735, 736 (1949) (“[I]t is the
Constitution which [a judge] swore to support and defend, not the gloss which his
predecessors may have put on it.”); Michael Stokes Paulsen, Captain James T. Kirk and the
Enterprise of Constitutional Interpretation: Some Modest Proposals–From the Twenty-Third
Century, 59 ALB. L. REV. 671, 680 (1995) (arguing that it is itself unconstitutional for courts
“to give greater legal force to its own prior decisions than to the Constitution”).
79 See Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Interpretive Force of the
Constitution’s Secret Drafting History, 91 GEO L.J. 1113, 1128 (2003) (arguing that the
Constitution itself “appears to prescribe textualism (in some form or another) as the proper
mode of interpretation and application of the Constitution”).
80 See Martin H. Redish & Karen L. Drizin, Constitutional Federalism and Judicial
Review: The Role of Textual Analysis, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 19 (1987) (reasoning that “the
language actually adopted is the best evidence of what the drafters intended”).
81 See U.S. CONST. art. I, §10, cl. 2 (“No State shall, without the Consent of the Congress,
lay any Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports, except what may be absolutely necessary
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the power of states to tax imports should apply with equal force to
exports. Indeed, it is nearly inconceivable to read the Import-Export
Clause as implicitly requiring the application of a more stringent
test for exports than for imports in light of the fact that the Framers
elsewhere explicitly provided for different treatment between
imports and exports.82 Unlike the Export Clause, the Import-Export
Clause does not single out exports for a more exacting form of
scrutiny than imports.
The Supreme Court has already dismissed the notion that
imports and exports should be treated differently. The Washington
Stevedoring Court, which first applied the Michelin approach to
exports, noted that pre-Michelin cases adopted separate tests for
imports and exports.83 These separate tests were necessary
inquiries to determine whether a good was, in fact, an import or
export.84 After Michelin, however, the inquiry is no longer about
“the nature of the goods” but is instead about “the nature of the tax
at issue.”85 Therefore, the Washington Stevedoring Court concluded
that “the Michelin approach should apply to taxation involving
exports as well as imports,” despite any formal differences between
exports and imports themselves.86 The extent to which Washington
Stevedoring adopts a different approach for exports and imports is
driven only by the text of the Constitution because the Export
Clause prohibits the Federal Government from using exports as a
source of revenue entirely.87

for executing its inspection Laws; and the net Produce of all Duties and Imposts, laid by any
State on Imports or Exports, shall be for the Use of the Treasury . . . .”).
82 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 5 (prohibiting any federal taxes or duties on “[a]rticles
exported from any State” with no mention of imports).
83 See Dep’t of Revenue v. Ass’n of Wash. Stevedoring Cos., 435 U.S. 734, 758 (1978)
(noting that “the analysis in the export cases had differed from that in the import cases”).
84 See id. at 760 (stating that “what constitutes an import or export” was once “the
exclusive consideration” in applying the Import-Export Clause).
85 See Limbach v. Hooven & Allison Co., 466 U.S. 353, 360 (1984) (“Michelin changed the
focus of Import-Export Clause cases from the nature of the goods as imports to the nature of
the tax at issue.”).).
86 Ass’n of Wash. Stevedoring Co., 435 U.S. at 758.
87 See id. (noting that the second prong of the Michelin approach—whether the tax at issue
diverts revenue from the government—is not a concern when analyzing a tax that falls on
exports “because the Constitution forbids federal taxation of exports”).
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2. The Import-Export Clause Focuses on the Nature of the Tax,
Not the Goods
The central holding of Michelin was that courts must no longer
focus on whether the goods at issue are imports or exports but
instead whether the taxes at issue are “Imposts or Duties.”88 This
holding was based on the text of the Constitution, which necessarily
implied that the Import-Export Clause did not prohibit every type
of tax, but only those taxes which could be characterized as “Imposts
or Duties.”89 In 1787, these terms had specific meanings that did not
encompass every non-discriminatory tax that fell on imports or
exports. Instead, “imposts” generally indicated “custom duties,”
which were taxes “collected on imports and exports, at the time and
place of importation or exportation, respectively.”90 “Duties” were
construed more broadly as including most exactions except property
taxes.91 The common characteristic of both imposts and duties was
that they were directed at imports and exports as such.92 The
Michelin Court, after detailing the early usage of these terms,
concluded that the language of the Import-Export Clause is
ambiguous enough that “Imposts or Duties” embraces only taxation
which offends the underlying policies of the Import-Export Clause.93
The Michelin Court defined imposts and duties as mere transit

88 See id. at 759 (stating that Richfield Oil “ignores the central holding of Michelin that
the absolute ban is only of ‘Imposts or Duties’ and not of all taxes”).
89 See Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276, 290 (1976) (explaining that the ImportExport Clause plainly does not “prohibit[] every exaction or ‘tax’ which falls in some measure
on imported goods” because “Congress is empowered to ‘lay and collect Taxes, Duties,
Imposts, and Excises’” under Article I, Section 8 of the United States Constitution).
90 See 1 W. CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED
STATES 296 (1953) (explaining the original meaning of imposts).
91 See id. (defining “duties” as including nearly all taxes except “[p]oll, or capitation taxes;
land taxes; and general property taxes”). But see Ass’n of Wash. Stevedoring Cos., 435 U.S. at
760 n.26 (criticizing Crosskey’s definition of “duties” as encompassing excises because “[h]e
does not explain . . . why Art. I, § 8, cl. 1, enumerated ‘Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises’ if
the Framers intended duties to include excises”).
92 See Michelin, 423 U.S. at 292 (asserting that the “characteristic common to both
‘imposts’ and ‘duties’ was that they were exactions directed at imports and commercial
activity as such”).
93 See id. at 293–94 (declining to presume the Import-Export Clause “was intended to
embrace taxation that does not create the evils the Clause was specifically intended to
eliminate” because “[t]he terminology employed in the Clause—‘Imposts or Duties’—is
sufficiently ambiguous”).
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fees.94 Therefore, the determination of which taxes are prohibited as
“Imposts or Duties” requires the application of the Michelin policybased approach.
3. There is No Textual Support for the “In Transit” Distinction
The original reservation in Michelin has no basis in the text of
the Import-Export Clause. In deciding that the Georgia tax was not
the type of tax prohibited by the Import-Export Clause, the Michelin
Court asserted that “[n]othing in the history of the Import-Export
Clause even remotely suggests that a nondiscriminatory ad valorem
property tax which is also imposed on imported goods that are no
longer in import transit was the type of exaction that was regarded
as objectionable by the Framers of the Constitution.”95 As an
explanation for the “in transit” reservation, the Court noted that a
non-discriminatory ad valorem property tax was different from a
mere transit fee but that “to the extent there is any conflict
whatsoever with this purpose of the Clause, it may be secured
merely by prohibiting the assessment of even nondiscriminatory
property taxes on goods which are merely in transit through the
State when the tax is assessed.”96 The questionable status of
Richfield Oil can be traced back to this arbitrary distinction, which
has been criticized as standing in contrast to the otherwise wellreasoned Michelin opinion.97
The “in transit” distinction appears nowhere in the text of the
Import-Export Clause. To the extent that the Michelin Court
indicates that such a distinction is mandated by the underlying
purposes of the Import-Export Clause, it does so with the phrase
“whatsoever,” which implies that a non-discriminatory tax would

94 See id. at 287 (stating that imposts and duties were “essentially taxes on the commercial
privilege of bringing goods into a country”).
95 Id. at 286 (emphasis added). However, the “in import transit” distinction is no longer a
consideration when evaluating the constitutionality of state taxes on import goods. The “in
transit” reservation has only survived as applied to exports.
96 Id. at 290.
97 See, e.g., Hellerstein, supra note 1, at 113 (calling Michelin “an uncertain guide” because
the Michelin Court’s “terse treatment” of the in transit issue stood in stark contrast with “its
leisurely and discursive exploration of the historical issues raised”).
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not necessarily be in conflict with the purposes of the Import-Export
Clause and that such a conflict is only a possibility.98
That the non-textual “in transit” reservation in Michelin was not
intended to serve as a bright-line rule of constitutional tax
immunity is made clear when reading the reservation in its
context.99 This is because the paragraph in which the “in transit”
reservation appears distinguishes taxation which “do[es] not
interfere with the free flow of imported goods among the States” and
“is the quid pro quo for benefits actually conferred by the taxing
State” from “the exactions by States under the Articles of
Confederation directed solely at imported goods.”100 The ImportExport Clause was intended to exempt taxes that were merely
transit fees, which necessarily interfere with the flow of imports and
exports and are not truly quid pro quo for state services.101 While a
tax on export or import goods in transit may be more likely to offend
the purposes of the Import-Export Clause, such a bright-line rule is
not required by the Import-Export Clause.
The text of the Import-Export Clause plainly demonstrates that
there is no justification to retain the Richfield Oil rule. While the
Import-Export Clause makes no effort to distinguish between the
level of protection from state taxes afforded to exports as opposed to
imports, Richfield Oil treats exports and imports differently by
adding a bright-line rule of invalidity only on exports.102 Moreover,
Richfield Oil ignores the original meaning of “Imposts or Duties” by
focusing on the nature of the goods being taxed rather than the
nature of the tax itself. This conflates the specificity of “Imposts or
Duties” with all forms of taxation. The reservation for “in transit”
goods has no basis in the Import-Export Clause itself and should not
be understood as creating a bright-line rule of constitutional tax
98 See Va. Indon. Co. v. Harris Cty. Appraisal Dist., 910 S.W.2d 905, 919 (Tex. 1995)
(Hecht, J. dissenting) (arguing that the “use of the word ‘whatsoever’ suggests, if anything,
that such conflict in any event is minimal”).
99 See id. (observing that “the context in which the passage appears makes it doubtful that
the Supreme Court contemplated any prohibition against nondiscriminatory ad valorem
taxes on imports and exports in transit except in very limited circumstances, let alone an
absolute prohibition”).
100 Michelin Tire Corp., 423 U.S. at 287–89.
101 See Va. Indon. Co., 910 S.W.2d at 919 (Hecht, J. dissenting) (concluding that “[t]he
Import-Export Clause was intended to prohibit exaction of fees for nothing more than the
privilege of moving through a state’s ports”).
102 Richfield Oil Corp. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 329 U.S. 69, 85–86 (1946).
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immunity. Unlike the Richfield Oil rule, the policy-based approach
adopted in Michelin is consistent with the text of the Import-Export
Clause and should therefore apply equally to export goods in transit
as it does import goods in transit.
B. THE INTENT OF THE IMPORT-EXPORT CLAUSE

In Michelin, the Court clearly signaled its departure from the old,
mechanistic approaches to the Import-Export Clause.103 In its place,
the Michelin court developed a policy-based approach that is in
harmony with the three main concerns of the Framers in including
the Import-Export Clause.104 Because the text of the Import-Export
Clause is sufficiently ambiguous, courts ought to consider the
intentions of the Framers of the Constitution.105
1. Richfield Oil Risks Distorting the Framers’ Intent
The bright-line immunity for export goods in transit preserved
in Richfield Oil may be a shorthand attempt to conform to the
intentions underlying the Import-Export Clause but is less precise
than the Michelin approach. As identified by the Michelin Court,
the Import-Export Clause was intended to allow the Federal
Government to speak with one voice, protect imports as a source of
federal revenue, and ensure harmony between the states.106 A tax
allowed by Richfield Oil’s in transit rule is less likely to offend these
intentions, while a tax prohibited by Richfield Oil probably does
offend them.107 Conversely, the Michelin approach produces results
coextensive with constitutional policy because it considers the
underlying policies directly. To apply the Richfield Oil per se rule of
103 See U.S. Steel Mining Co. v. Helton, 631 S.E.2d 559, 564 (2005) (rejecting the argument
that “the Michelin policy-based analysis has not fully supplanted the more mechanistic ‘in
export transit’ approach of earlier cases like Richfield Oil”).
104 423 U.S. at 283 (developing an approach based on the “type[s] of state exaction which
the Framers of the Constitution . . . had in mind as being an ‘impost’ or ‘duty’”).
105 See Michelin Tire Co., 423 U.S. at 293–94 (upholding the Georgia tax under the ImportExport Clause because “only the clearest constitutional mandate should lead us to condemn
such taxation” when “[t]he terminology employed in the Clause ‘Imposts or Duties’ is
sufficiently ambiguous”).
106 See 423 U.S. at 285–86 (listing underlying purposes of the Import-Export Clause).
107 See Va. Indon. Co. v. Harris Cty. Appraisal Dist., 910 S.W.2d 905, 919 (Tex. 1995)
(Hecht, J., dissenting) (arguing that while the “in-transit rule is a good rule of thumb,” it is
“neither a deduction from nor a restatement of the policies embodied in the constitutional
provision”).
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tax immunity to invalidate a tax that would otherwise be upheld
under the Michelin approach would lead to an illogical result: a tax
that does not offend the policies of the Import-Export Clause but is
nevertheless prohibited.108 While the factual issue of whether a good
remains in transit may be considered under the Michelin approach,
it is not treated as dispositive.109 In contrast, the Richfield Oil test,
which considers this lone, isolated fact as a stand-in for a purposive
inquiry, risks distorting the Import-Export Clause. Using Richfield
Oil to prohibit state taxation otherwise allowed by Michelin “would
not further the objectives of the Import-Export Clause.”110
2. Richfield Oil Risks Subsidizing Exporters at the Expense of
Local Taxpayers
The Import-Export Clause was not intended to prohibit state
taxation if it is simply the quid pro quo for the benefits conferred by
the taxing state. 111 As the Michelin Court noted, the Import-Export
Clause was included in the Constitution to prohibit those taxes
which were merely transit fees, which is not the same as taxes on
goods in transit.112 If a state has conferred actual benefits such as
police and fire protection to export goods while they are in transit,
the state should be able to tax the exporter in exchange.113 A rule
that provides absolute constitutional tax immunity to export goods
both undermines federalism and risks allowing exporters to avoid
108 See id. at 921 (“For there to be an exception to the Michelin rule, there must be some
tax that was fully consistent with constitutional policies but nevertheless prohibited, or a tax
that was inconsistent with such policies and yet permitted. Neither is possible.”).
109 See id. at 916 ( “Whether property is in transit, and more importantly, how it is in
transit, remains a relevant factor in assessing the validity of a tax, but it is not the only
factor.”).
110 Michelin Tire Corp., 423 U.S. at 293.
111 Joy Oil Co. v. State Tax Comm’n, 337 U.S. 286, 288 (1949) (stating that the ImportExport Clause was not intended “to relieve property eventually to be exported from its share
of the cost of local services”).
112 See Michelin Tire Corp., 423 U.S. at 290 ( “In effect, the Clause was fashioned to prevent
the imposition of exactions which were no more than transit fees on the privilege of moving
through a State.”).
113 See Xerox Corp. v. Harris County, 459 U.S. 145, 158 (1982) (Powell, J., dissenting)
(arguing that the tax at issue should be upheld because the “goods benefited from police and
fire protection and the various other services provided by the County and City,” the nondiscriminatory tax “‘simply ma[de] the imported goods pay their own way, as opposed to
exactly a fee merely for the privilege of moving through a State’”) (quoting Dep’t of Revenue
v. Ass’n of Wash. Stevedoring Cos., 435 U.S. 734, 764 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the result) (internal quotations omitted)).
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paying taxes for the state benefits they receive. This would also
increasingly burden coastal states.114 Just as there is no reason for
local taxpayers to subsidize importers, there is no reason the
Constitution should demand that local taxpayers subsidize
exporters.115
The Richfield Oil in transit rule provides just this type of subsidy
to exporters and foreign consumers by exempting exporters from
paying taxes for the state benefits they actually receive. Justice
Black, dissenting in Richfield Oil, declined to endorse a rule that
would “result[] in creating an island of constitutional tax immunity
for a substantial proportion of the profitable businesses of the
nation” on the grounds that “the history and the evolution of the
constitutional prohibition against taxation of exports manifest that
there was no intention to subsidize either export businesses or
foreign purchasers by any such broad immunity from state and
federal taxation.”116 Black argued that the tax at issue in Richfield
Oil “and its economic consequences plainly are not those which the
writers of the Constitution condemned.”117 Under Richfield Oil, a
producer of goods stored on a ship or airplane destined to foreign
consumers would be immune to even non-discriminatory state
taxation while a producer selling the very same type of goods instate or to another state would be subject to those same taxes.118 Not
114 See Louisiana Land and Expl. Co. v. Pilot Petroleum Co., 900 F.2d 816, 822 (1990) (Jolly,
J., dissenting) (observing that “it is only coastal states that bear the regulatory,
administrative, and increasingly, environmental, costs of [maritime] commerce”).
115 See Michelin Tire Corp., 423 U.S. at 289 (“There is no reason why local taxpayers should
subsidize the services used by the importer; ultimate consumers should pay for such services
as police and fire protection accorded the goods just as much as they should pay
transportation costs associated with those goods.”); see also Va. Indon. Co. v. Harris Cty.
Appraisal Dist., 910 S.W.2d 905, 919 (Tex. 1995) (Hecht, J. dissenting) (“The Clause was not
intended to exempt imports and exports from their fair share of the cost of police and fire
protection and other such services rendered by the state through which goods pass.”);
Louisiana Land and Expl. Co., 900 F.2d at 822 (Jolly, J., dissenting) (“The Framers did not
intend [coastal] states to bear all these costs” of exporting goods.).
116 Richfield Oil Corp. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 329 U.S. 69, 87, 89 (1946) (Black, J.,
dissenting).
117 Id. at 89.
118 The Civil War era decision in Woodruff v. Parkham, 8 Wall. 123 (1869) held that the
Import-Export Clause applied only to foreign trade and not trade between states. While not
overturned, this decision has been criticized in light of the Michelin revolution. See, e.g.,
Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 634 (1997) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (criticizing the Woodruff Court’s “weak textual analysis” and arguing that it “no
longer has any force” after Michelin); Bittker & Denning, supra note 7, at 541 (arguing that
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only does the retention of the Richfield Oil rule discriminate among
the producers, but it ultimately subsidizes foreign consumers over
domestic consumers.119 The Michelin Court rejected the idea that
some goods should receive “preferential treatment that permits
escape from uniform taxes imposed without regard to foreign origin
for services which the State supplies.”120 Just as the Framers did
not intend to give preferential treatment to the purchase of foreign
goods with a prohibition on non-discriminatory import taxes,121
neither did they intend to discourage American consumers from
buying American products by subsidizing domestic producers only
when their products are shipped abroad.
3. Richfield Oil Prohibits Otherwise Valid, Non-Discriminatory
Taxation
The historical background leading to the inclusion of the ImportExport Clause demonstrates that the Framers intended to prevent
discriminatory taxation by the states.122 Even Richfield Oil
concedes that “the history of the Import-Export Clause shows that
it was designed to preclude the levy of general taxes applicable alike

the “veritable lexicon of late eighteenth century legal and business terminology” that the
Michelin Court relied on in its decision leads to the conclusion that “one would have to reject
Woodruff v. Parham, and apply the Import-Export Clause to interstate as well as foreign
commerce”).
119 This is similar to the dissent’s example of tax disadvantages for domestic wine sellers
in Hooven & Allison Co. v. Evatt, 324 U.S. 652, 690–91 (1945) (Black, J., dissenting). Justice
Black argued that “[t]he whole history of events leading up to the Constitution” does not
sugget that “the Constitution required such tax discriminations against American products .
. . .” Id. at 690. After Michelin, this reasoning was vindicated when the majority’s rule in
Evatt was overruled by Limbach v. Hooven & Allison Co., 466 U.S. 353 (1984). Likewise, there
is no indication that the Constitution requires such tax discriminations against American
consumers.
120 Michelin Tire Corp., 423 U.S. at 287 (citation omitted).
121 See id. (noting that the prevention of incidental burdens on imports was not “even
remotely an objective of the Framers in enacting the prohibition”); see also Bradford Exch.
A.G. v. Illinois Dep’t of Revenue, 508 N.E.2d 316, 321 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987) (arguing that under
Michelin, taxpayers should not “receive preferential treatment by being allowed to escape
from State taxes imposed uniformly and without discrimination upon all persons doing
business in the State”).
122 See Michelin Tire Corp., 423 U.S. at 282–83 (concluding that non-discriminatory ad
valorem property taxes were not prohibited by the Import-Export Clause because it could be
plainly “inferred from consideration of the specific abuses which led the Framers to include
the Import-Export Clause in the Constitution”).
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to all goods.”123 Therefore, whether a state tax is imposed uniformly
and without discrimination upon all persons doing business in the
state should be a threshold question in determining whether such
tax falls within the prohibition of the Import-Export Clause.124
Furthermore, the emphasis on whether a tax is non-discriminatory
comports perfectly with the Michelin approach.125 In explaining its
policy-based approach, the Michelin Court emphasized the nondiscriminatory nature of taxes that did not offend the underlying
policies of the Import-Export Clause.126 First, the Court noted that
non-discriminatory taxes, which by definition do not fall on goods
“because of their place of origin,” can obviously have “no impact
whatsoever on the Federal Government’s exclusive regulation of
foreign commerce.”127 Likewise, the Court concluded that nondiscriminatory taxes “do not interfere with the free flow of imported
goods among the States” because unlike “the exactions by States
under the Articles of Confederation,” non-discriminatory taxes were
not “directed solely at imported goods.”128 Therefore, in most cases,
a state tax on export goods in transit would not violate the policies
123 See Richfield Oil Corp. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 329 U.S. 69, 76 (1946) (concluding
that this proposition was supported by the Constitutional Convention, the debates, and the
Federalist Papers). Richfield Oil claimed that this “function was only a phase of a larger
design” because the purpose was “to deprive any State of the power [to tax imports or exports]
except with the consent of Congress.” Id. at 76–77. However, Michelin held that the ImportExport Clause did not enact an absolute prohibition on any state taxation of imports or
exports. Michelin Tire Corp., 423 U.S. at 293–94 (“The terminology employed in the [ImportExport] Clause . . . is sufficiently ambiguous that we must decline to presume it was intended
to embrace taxation that does not create the evils the [Import-Export] Clause was specifically
intended to eliminate.”). Therefore, Richfield Oil’s distinction of the history of the ImportExport Clause with the “larger design” is a nullity.
124 See Early & Weitzman, supra note 34, at 250 (arguing that “[t]he differentiation
between discriminatory and nondiscriminatory taxation by the states should be considered a
threshold issue” and that if the tax is non-discriminatory, then “the tax should be allowed
since it is not within the scope of the [I]mport-[E]xport [C]lause”).
125 See Michelin Tire Corp., 423 U.S. at 286 (distinguishing “discriminatory state taxation
against imported goods as imports” from an exaction that was “not regarded as an
impediment that severely hampered commerce or constituted a form of tribute by seaboard
States to the disadvantage of the other States”).
126 Id.
127 Id.; see also Bradford Exch. A.G. v. Ill. Dep’t of Revenue, 508 N.E.2d 316, 321 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1987) (concluding that the tax did not infringe on “the Federal [G]overnment’s need to
deal uniformly with foreign nations” when “the tax is a nondiscriminatory exaction applied
without regard to the origin of the goods” because “there is no danger that imports will be
selectively taxed based upon their foreign origin or that States will be able to apply the tax
in a manner which would create a protective tariff”).
128 Michelin Tire Corp.. 423 U.S. at 288.
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set forth in Michelin if it is imposed uniformly, without
discrimination, and is not merely a transit fee.
While the bright-line immunity for export goods in transit
provided by Richfield Oil is a shorthand attempt to comply with the
underlying purposes of the Import-Export Clause, it is a poor
substitute for the Michelin approach. Because any tax upheld under
the Michelin approach would be consistent with the underlying
purposes of the Import-Export Clause, the retention of Richfield Oil
as an exception to Michelin suggests the illogical result that there
may be a state tax that would be upheld under Michelin as
consistent with the purposes of the Import-Export Clause yet
nonetheless struck down under Richfield Oil. The Richfield Oil in
transit rule risks prohibiting state taxation that is the quid pro quo
for benefits the state confers. The result from the Richfield Oil rule
is inconsistent with the Import-Export Clause, which was intended
neither to force local taxpayers to subsidize exporters and foreign
consumers nor to unfairly burden coastal states with the regulatory,
administrative, and environmental costs of shipping exports. The
prohibition imposed by Richfield Oil also fails to distinguish
between discriminatory and non-discriminatory taxation, which is
important in determining whether a state tax violates the
underlying purposes of the Import-Export Clause. Because the
Michelin approach is precisely tailored to address the concerns that
motivated the Framers to include the Import-Export Clause, courts
should not apply the Richfield Oil exception to the Michelin
approach to invalidate state taxes that violate no constitutional
objectives.
IV. CONCLUSION
After decades of economic rivalries between the states, the
Framers included the Import-Export Clause in the Constitution to
serve three purposes: to empower the new Federal Government to
speak with one voice, to protect import revenues from diversion to
the states, and to promote harmony between the states. Early
Import-Export Clause decisions focused on the nature of the goods
being taxed, holding that all imports and exports enjoyed absolute
immunity from state taxation.
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Michelin changed this analysis by recognizing that the ImportExport Clause did not serve as an absolute prohibition on all
exactions but only those taxes characterized as imposts or duties.129
This shifted the analysis from a focus on the nature of the goods to
the nature of the tax. Under the Michelin approach, the underlying
constitutional policies and the scope of the Import-Export Clause’s
prohibition are coextensive. However, Michelin and later decisions
declined to reach the question of export goods in transit, allowing
the bright-line rule in Richfield Oil to linger as the lone exception
to Michelin’s general rule.130
The text of the Import-Export Clause demonstrates that the
Richfield Oil exception must be overturned. While the Clause is
written to apply with equal force to imports and exports, Richfield
Oil establishes a zone of absolute constitutional tax immunity only
for export goods in transit. Moreover, Richfield Oil prohibits all
taxes on export goods in transit while the Import-Export Clause, in
contrast to other constitutional provisions on taxation, prohibits
only imposts and duties.
Richfield Oil also contorts the constitutional policies underlying
the Import-Export Clause. Because the policies of the Michelin
approach and the purposes leading to the inclusion of the ImportExport Clause are coextensive, any tax upheld under Michelin could
not violate the Import-Export Clause as intended by the Framers.
To allow Richfield Oil to strike down such a tax would result in
unconstitutional taxes that nonetheless conform with the policies of
the Constitution. Additionally, the Michelin approach distinguishes
between taxes that are the quid pro quo for benefits conferred by
the taxing state and taxes that are merely transit fees. Richfield Oil
does not consider this fact, resulting in subsidizing exporters and
foreign consumers at the expense of local taxpayers. The Richfield
Oil in transit rule also disregards the central distinction made in
Michelin and its progeny between discriminatory and nondiscriminatory taxation.

129 See id. at 293–94 (declining to condemn a non-discriminatory tax because the
terminology of “imposts or duties” embraces only taxation that “create[s] the evils the
[Import-Export] Clause was specifically intended to eliminate”).
130 See Dep’t of Revenue v. Ass’n of Wash. Stevedoring Cos., 435 U.S. 735, 757 n.23 (1978)
(deferring decision on “the question of the applicability of the Michelin approach when a State
directly taxes imports or exports in transit”).
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Because Richfield Oil is an anachronism in the wake of the
Michelin approach and cannot be supported by either the text or
underlying policies of the Import-Export Clause, courts should
decline to apply its bright-line rule of constitutional tax immunity
to export goods in transit. The Michelin approach, based in both the
text and policies of the Import-Export Clause, should be applied
equally to both imports and exports in determining the
constitutionality of state taxes.
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